B
efore The Joint Commission's (TJC) Sentinel Event Alert 2 in 2006, many hospitals and health systems used tubing, catheters, and syringes in multiple settings and for multiple purposes along the patient care continuum. This only made sense: a product with multiple functions was preferred to those with only 1 function, as the former could be bought in bulk numbers at lower cost. This "system design" was one factor in the rise of tubing misconnections over the past 3 decades. The currently accepted definition of a tubing misconnection is "apparent incompatible systems that, when inadvertently connected, can result in life-threatening events in the clinical area." 3 An enteral misconnection is an inadvertent connection between an enteral feeding system and a nonenteral system, such as an intravascular line, peritoneal dialysis catheter, medical gas tubing, and so forth.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The earliest known report of an enteral misconnection was published in 1972 in Lancet. 4 A young man who was receiving intragastric milk feedings received approximately 100 mL of milk intravenously before the error was discovered. This error was attributed to unclear ordering of therapy by the physician. The "look-alike" issue of the milk feeding with intravenous (IV) fat emulsion mixture, which was newly on the market and in use, also played a role in the error. Later, in 1983, a case report analysis recommended design of "incompatible connectors" as a means of preventing future errors. 5 The first warning related to this issue came from the Emergency Care Research Institute in 1986. The Emergency Care Research Institute started in 1968 but broadened its scope beyond emergency care in the 1970s and now researches the best practices for improving safety, quality, and cost of patient care. 6 It was then 10 years later (1996) when the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) published standards for feeding devices and recommended that adapters and connectors be incompatible with luer-lock rigid connectors.
1. Intravenous administrations connected to epidural lines and epidural solutions connected to peripheral or central IV catheters. 2. Bladder irrigation solutions hung with IV tubing being connected as secondary infusions into peripheral or central IV catheters. 3. Intravenous administration into indwelling bladder catheters. 4. Intravenous administration connected to nasogastric tubes or enteral feeding solutions connected to peripheral or central IV catheters. 5. Intravenous administration with blood administration sets and blood products transfused via primary IV tubing. 6. Primary IV solutions given through various other, functionally dissimilar catheters (dialysis catheters, ventriculostomy drains, amnio-infusion catheters, and pulmonary artery catheters).
The ro ot cause analysis of these cases implicated the interchangeability of luer connectors as the major contributing factor. Other influences included the routine use of tubing for unintended purposes (IV extension tubing used for enteral feeding) and positioning of functionally dissimilar tubes in close proximity of each other. Human factors (HF s) identified in the root cause analysis included care transitions (patient moving from one service or location to another) and staff fatigue associated with working consecutive shifts. 2 About the same time as TJC Sentinel Event Alert was published, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the American Society for Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition (ASPEN) surveyed hospitals and members to better understand the factors associated with tubing misconnections. Of those who responded to the survey (n = 182), 16 .1% affirmed an event in their institution and 26.1% reported unknown events. More than 30% of respondents confirmed that they were currently using lu er connectors in at least some of their enteral feeding systems and another 20% used extension tubing with luer connectors. 3 It was a year later when the British National Health Service issued a National Public Safety Alert regarding misconnections, with 33 documented incidents related to oral liquids given intravenously from 2005 to 2006. 8 In 2009, the ASPEN published an update on the enteral feeding misconnection issue and discussed progress toward quality, safety, and elimination of events through design standards and innovation in purchasing strategies. 5 The ASPEN collaborated with Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to develop national guidelines for enteral nutrition administration, which is now posted in the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality National Guideline Clearinghouse. 9 Recommendations were graded on the basis of the strength of evidence to support the recommendation (Grades A to C, with "A" being "good" evidence to support recommendation and "C" being recommendation based on expert opinion or editorial consensus). Recommendations from the National Guideline of Enteral Nutrition Administration are summarized in the Table. Then, in early 2010, the Institution of Safe Medication Practices issued and alert via NurseAdvise-ERR related to official color standards for enteral feeding equipment and PICCs (peripherally inserted central catheters). Purple is not an official color standard for either enteral products or PICCs in the United States, although it is the official color of enteral products in the United Kingdom. 10 In January 2011, AAMI announced the adoption of international design standards seeking to reduce tubing misconnections among different types of devices. 11 The first of a 7-standard series was designed for manufacturers to offer guidance to create proprietary smallbore connectors for their own devices to mitigate risk and offering strategies for validation of new designs. It is AAMI's goal, in conjunction with the FDA and International Organization for Standardization, to fully implement these standards by 2014. 12 The FDA later released draft recommendations for industry on safety considerations to mitigate risks of misconnections with small-bore connectors intended for enteral applications. These guidelines were published via the Federal Register on July 27, 2012, for public comment. Comments were closed after 90 days and release date of final guidelines is unknown. Once the standard is published, manufacturers will be given up to 18 months to revamp processes to meet the new standards.
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HUMAN FACTOR INFLUENCES
Based on the current discussion, the issue of misconnections appears to be one mostly related to design flaws in medical device equipment used in the healthcare setting. But that is not entirely true. Over the past several years, there have been several HFs tied to the patient safety risk of tubing misconnections. Hu man factor research studies the intersection of people, technology, policy, and work across multiple domains. Human factor research uses an interdisciplinary approach to evaluate the interaction of cognitive and organizational psychology, human performance, industrial engineering, and systems engineering.
14 As applied to healthcare, HF research allows for improved processes, devices, and systems that support the work of caregivers and improve patient outcomes. 
RISK-REDUCTION STRATEGIES
Patients in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) are not immune from the risk of tubing misconnections. Misconnection errors in the neonatal population often result in significant adverse outcomes (permanent loss of function or death). 15, 16 In 2010, Wallace and Steward 17 conducted a descriptive study of enteral feeding practices in level 3 to 4 NICUs across Ohio. They had a 66% return rate on the surveys (the total number of level 3 NICUs was 18). All (100%) of the responding NICUs used medication syringe pumps for enteral feeding, only two thirds reported using safety tubing to prevent misconnections, and none reported the presence of a standardized protocol to address the safety concerns associated with syringe pumps designed for medication delivery use with enteral feeding. 18 Because error reporting (or near misses) is currently voluntary, enteral misconnections in the NICU may be greatly underreported as compared with actual or "near miss" cases. Each facility should have a protocol for reporting adverse events and near misses. Any misconnection issues should be reported to the FDA through its MedWatch reporting system. 19 The role of fr ontline providers of care in preventing these errors across the continuum cannot be Education deficits, awareness of clinicians, and other HF challenges were the impetus for the ASPEN campaign for nurses to "Be ALERT," using the ALERT acronym to convey critical steps in the enteral feeding process (see Figure 1) . In 2010, the campaign, in conjunction with Nestle Corporation, launched a second phase, this time aimed at safe practices of enteral medication delivery, encouraging nurses to "Be AWARE" (see Figure 2) . In 2011, the third campaign phase focused on the pediatric populations with a "Be READY" acronym (see Figure 3) .
Many times, frontline staff are not involved in purchasing decisions. So equipment and devices are purchased without knowledge of "end-user" impact to workflow, possible failures, and potential safety risks. In an effort to decrease costs, some products are purchased for multiple functions, but this practice can have catastrophic impact on patient safety because of risk of misconnections.
At other times, misconnections are the result of performance errors. Expert clinicians who are "unaware" of the misconnection but have full knowledge of the danger related to such a connection often make these errors. There are many environmental contributors to performance errors in the healthcare arena. These factors include time pressures, rotating shift work, fatigue, inadequate training and inadequate lighting, and transfer of patients from one setting to another. 5 − Closely monitor staffing patterns and other practices that contribute to fatigue and take appropriate action to minimize. 2, [24] [25] [26] − Eliminate "bulk" dispensing of medications; use only oral syringes for administration of enteral medications. 27 − Clear and concise institutional policies/protocols related to enteral feeding and IV therapy practices. Incorporate these policies and processes into orientation and continuing professional development activities of care providers.
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Device Design Changes − Redesign of connectors to a "forcing function design." 11, 13 Forcing function design, used in medical gases, make misconnections impossible because they provide a physical barrier when incorrect connections are attempted. − Enteral feeding equipment must not fit into IV equipment to prevent work-around solutions, which can lead to misconnections. − Standardization for all of the points of connection for enteral feeding systems, including color, connectors, tubing, pumps, and ports. 5, 20, 22 − Standardization of color-coding of tubing and connections. 21 A comprehensive discussion of this topic would not be complete without addressing the potential barriers to implementation of risk-reduction strategies. The first, and possibly most significant barrier, would be that of cost. The cost of redesign of systems and connectors may be significant for manufacturers and medical device companies. There is also considerable cost associated with conversion to "forced function" systems and supply chain purchasing practices. This barrier is increased by insufficient research data and costbenefit analysis data for implementation of these recommendations. Return on investment will vary from institution to institution. 21 Human factors also present significant barriers to implementation. Staff acceptance of wrong route error prevention may be impacted through education and staff involvement in the error reporting and debriefing process. Staff involvement in purchasing processes and decision making will improve the diffusion and acceptance of policy and equipment changes. The potential for treatment delays after product conversion may occur, but prospective planning and accessible supply chain resources can minimize possible delays.
Long-term solutions to tubing misconnections appear to be several years away, as the medical device industry continues to offer resistance, the FDA approval process currently discourages safetyrelated changes and a final consensus from AAMI/ International Organization for Standardization has not yet been published. Some organizations and underestimated. Providers can impact risk reduction in 3 arenas of prevention: purchasing strategies, human factors, and design changes.
Purchasing Strategies
− Develop a comprehensive coordinated purchasing strategy to minimize risk to patients and providers.
• Substitute devices with safety features for those with functional similarities. 20 • Conduct testing for performance, safety, usability, and risk assessment before new tubing and catheter purchases to identify potential for misconnections. 21, 22 • Involve frontline staff in new product evaluation and purchasing decisions.
− Stop purchasing non-IV equipment with connectors that can "mate" with a female luer IV catheter connector. 2 Specifically, avoid purchase of gastrointestinal tubes that have female luer connectors. 5 − Purchase adequate numbers of pumps so that IV or medication syringe pumps are not used to deliver enteral feedings. − Purchase/use oral syringes to draw up and administer medications into an enteral feeding system.
Human Factors
− Do not rely on color-coding to prevent misconnections. Remember that colors are not always consistent within or specific to device groups. Color coding also varies across institutions in the same community, thereby increasing risk with agency and travel staff. 2 • Hospitals and health systems are encouraged to standardize color-coding of enteral systems, both internally and within their local healthcare community.
• Color-coding standardization is key within the entire hospital/health system so as to prevent errors caused by staff floating from unit to unit.
− Never modify feeding tube devices or exchange connectors. − Do not use any type of IV or medication tubing for feeding. − Follow standardized protocol for patient handoff and include line reconciliation process as part of the handover communication.
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− Trace lines and tubes back to site of insertion before accessing.
• Ensure adequate lighting and visualization of line/tube prior to access. 23 − Direct all vascular access lines toward the head of bed; direct all other tubes (enteral, renal, etc) toward the feet.
advocates believe that feeding tubes that can be connected to IV catheters are fundamentally unsafe. The risks regarding tubing misconnections are ever-present in the NICU. Given the current state of evidence, and despite acknowledgment of the dangers associated with misconnections, the system continues to produce, distribute, purchase, and utilize feeding systems without "fail safe" connectors. As care providers of an extremely vulnerable patient population, it is our duty to take action on behalf of our patients to ensure that history does not continue to repeat itself.
